Summary

The concept of an Adaptive Enterprise is relatively young, and with recent advances in technology it is within the reach of today’s organizations. Simply put, in an Adaptive Enterprise the use of technology can modify the way an organization behaves, namely in how it wrestles with change. To help visualize the capability of an Adaptive Enterprise, this Knowledge Brief presents an example that surprisingly was created back in 1940, in a very dire situation. Not only did it work, but it surpassed all expectations of the time and was instrumental in changing the course of history.

Paperback: 304 pages

Publisher: Multi-Media Publications Inc. (July 1, 2005)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 1895186196

ISBN-13: 978-1895186192

Background

This is the story of how one man under tremendous pressure inspired a nation to continue a fight considered lost. As a result, he created the equivalent of a modern day Adaptive Enterprise, using the emerging technologies of the day. In May 1940, after the fall of France, Winston Churchill was swept into power. Not only did he have to stave off an imminent enemy invasion but he had to quickly move the peacetime economy to one that could support a war. This meant focusing slender resources on the immediate threat, unifying a disparate economy, and directing its output into immediate military use. With very little time Churchill had to transform his organization to an Adaptive Enterprise so it could adapt to this unexpected situation. Of course he had to get it right the first time and make the investments count.

Bleak Situation

Even though the nation’s army had been saved, Dunkirk was a disaster in terms of losses of fighters, naval ships, and military equipment. With invasion imminent Churchill and his architects had to come up with something to save the situation as after all the very survival of the United Kingdom was at stake. However, by June 1940 the race to reach a target (set in 1939) of 1,200 fighters was lost. Horrendous losses in the previous campaigns of Norway and France had depleted the Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter Command of 50% of its fighter strength. The RAF now with 675 fighters faced the Luftwaffe’s 3,500 aircraft (1,100 fighters). The total UK factory output of 200 fighters per month could not possibly produce enough in fighters in time for a prolonged air battle.

Transformation

Churchill’s bigger vision was expanding the war and creating an alliance with the United States. But in the meantime, the UK had to hold its own. On May 22, Parliament granted Churchill government-wide emergency powers and the complete control of what had to done.

End goal

In the short term Churchill had to solve the problem of setting up an adequate defense, and increasing the RAF fighter capability by addressing the fighter production problems. In the longer term, if Churchill could repel the invasion, against all odds, then he had to move quickly into a position to wage total economic warfare for many years. For this he had to transform the UK economy right away and this would require a basic restructuring at many levels, and putting it onto a war footing so that it could sustain total war.

Difficult Investment Choices

To meet the short term goals a radically different approach was required not only in the production of fighters but how they would be deployed in operation. Increasing fighter production was not enough. In short the ability to respond to incoming attacks by targeting available fighters to only where they were needed. This is very much the same problem that organizations face today the agility to respond to changes. Churchill’s architects had to resist pressures, politics, and narrow down the many technology options to something manageable, and that could be delivered. They presented Churchill a few rough “technology diamonds” that have shown a lot of promise in development, namely:

• The enemy code breaking facility at Bletchley Park has cracked Enigma (top security codes).
• Radar equipment testing proves the success of the technology.
• A centralized and well organized RAF Fighter Command at Bentley Priory.
• A secure, blast proof, underground facility at Storey's Gate, close to Downing Street.

Critical Infrastructure Components

Churchill chose to invest in all of these emerging technologies and facilities. If these could be integrated into a solution then they could possibly maximize the available resources, and extend their possible reach. This was the design challenge that they had to meet.

Introduction of Key Concepts

The architects chose to introduce standardization, simplification, modularity, and common platform. These concepts all played a part in streamling the enterprise to maximum efficiency. How these were applied is described below.

Standardization

The supply chain was revamped. Production of fighters was limited to two proven types, the Hurricane and Spitfire which were already in quantity production to improve agility and speed up output. Fewer aircraft types left in production eliminated some business processes. Standardization provided everything needed for Hurricane and Spitfire production so it could be immediately stepped up. Standardization safeguarded the supply of materials and equipment already allocated for these types and made it possible to divert from other types the necessary parts, stocks of materials and components, and reserves of production capacity for immediate use. Aircraft parts were sourced from hundreds of large and small suppliers. With raw materials scarce and expensive, a Civilian Repair Organization (CRO) was established to recover downed aircraft. Using small civilian workshops and garages, recovered aircraft were either immediately repaired or cannibalized for spare parts.

Simplification

In the supply chain fighter production was simplified by reducing the number of small and disparate components by concentrating on completed subassemblies (fuselage frames, undercarriages, instrument panels, engines) shipped straight from suppliers. This reduced complexity from the business process execution.

At the code breaking facility at Bletchley Park, the complex decoding method (done laboriously by hand) was simplified and given a code name “Ultra”. It was then automated and scaled up using electro-mechanical machines which dramatically speeded up the time required to decode and translate enemy codes. If this operation was completed in a 24-hour window, it provided invaluable information on enemy intent and threats. This gave RAF fighter command early warning of when raids would commence, their size, and their likely targets. Ultra messages could also be carefully harvested to form an extensive knowledge base of the order of battle, right down to the names of individual field commanders and squadron leaders.

Modularity

In the supply chain expertise and best practices were brought in from the automobile manufacturing industry to speed up fighter production. Modularity was introduced where reusable components could be redeployed from bomber production. These could be switched back with changing needs after the air battle. Thus the components were decoupled from physical linkages to the business processes.

At RAF Fighter Command modular installations were set up in multiple networks in preference to a monolithic infrastructure. The modular installations were geographically distributed with built in redundancy to avoid any disruptions as these were all enemy targets. The installations formed the backbone of an early warning system:

• A network of radar stations was completed along the coast line with both short and long range capability. Long range radar tracked enemy aircraft up to 150 miles away, as aircraft were taking off from airfields in France. Short range radar took over, from a 20 mile radius, tracking positions in real time. Both systems operated on pattern recognition.
• A network of visual observers, volunteer sky watchers, from 1,000 posts was set up along coastline and in the south-east. The observer corps were trained to spot and identify all aircraft types based on silhouettes, and through communications equipment report sightings.
• A network of RAF operations centers, at group and sector level, and fighter stations, was completed. These kept track of their squadrons and fighters, and most importantly their current operational status, e.g., refueling, ready for take off, in air, or engaged in battle.

In the supply chain the business processes and infrastructure components for fighter production were connected. This allowed the production line to be broken out from large scale factories to much smaller facilities that could be dispersed across locations creating a network of integrated manufacturing. This was useful as all fighter production facilities were top priority targets for the Luftwaffe.

 
The Filter Room at RAF Fighter Command Headquarters at Bentley Priory was the communication hub that aggregated disparate information collected from multiple sources (Ultra, radar, observers, operations centers, and pilots). The information was integrated in real-time and passed directly into the Operations Room where it was displayed in a sophisticated model, the Map Table, depicting the skies over the UK. Color counters representing aircraft formations were sequenced to the operations room clock to provide 5 minute increments of the evolving air battle overhead. This provided a sophisticated early warning system so decision makers from the gantry could track the incoming raid. They could then use the Tote Model to determine what resources were available and how they could respond. The tote model reflected which squadrons in what sectors were ready and refueled to engage in immediate battle.

Common Platform

Information and orders were then cascaded from Bentley Priory to the hierarchy of operations centers at group and sector level where each center had an exact copy of the map table model and determined which fighters were ready and could be deployed from within each squadron. Each center leveraged all the resources at their disposal, including anti-aircraft, and selected the best tactics to use.